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Abstract
This article tests the existence of credit constraints on higher education access by estimating actual
marginal returns in the context of unobserved heterogeneity. We estimate higher education returns for
those who attend to it and compare them with those of individuals who are at the margin of attending
to it. Following the Carneiro and Heckman (2002) reasoning, if the returns of the latter group are larger
than those of the former one we could be in presence of unobservable barriers to higher education access,
such as credit constraints. We use a rich administrative database composed from three sources: data
of enrollment and graduation from the Chilean higher education system, test scores and labor market
outcomes from the Chilean Unemployment Insurance database. Our results suggest that, given the
existing nancial aid scheme, the returns for those individuals that are at the margin of attending to
higher education are lower than for those who decided to attend to it. This is, no evidence of credit
constraints is found for the Chilean Higher Education system. However, when conditioning on family
income, we nd that for the richer households some evidence of credit constraints is found.
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JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The promotion of higher education access, specially for those individuals with most limited economic re-
sources, has turned to be a priority in the public policy debate of several countries, no matter the political
spectrum. A common method for tackling this concern is by expanding the coverage of grants and student
loans. This expansion is grounded on the assumption that a fraction of the population faces credit constraints
for nancing their higher education studies, which may lead to human capital under investment and hence to
lower private and social returns. Nevertheless, these benets associated with lower credit constraints come
at a cost, the large scal burden of these policies and the alternative costs of resources that may be allocated
to individuals that may have access to private resources. Thus, these are elements that the authority must
be cautious with when expanding the coverage of benets, specially in a context of limited scal resources.
An indiscriminate growth of benets, in a context without credit constraints, carries signicant opportunity
costs because those resources may be destined to alternative public policies with larger social returns.
In this context, the identication of credit constraints is an important challenge for public policy. Several
approaches for testing the existence of credit constraints in higher education have been considered in the
literature, as it is very di¢ cult to identify credit constrained individuals (Kane, 1996). On the one hand,
there are articles focused on assessing the e¤ect that nancial aid has on enrollment (Kane, 1996, 2007;
Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2011; Rau , Rojas and Urzúa, 2013). On the
other hand, we nd studies that consider the economic returns of higher education (Carneiro and Heckman,
2002; Cameron and Taber, 2004; Kaufmann, 2012). The rst group analyzes if the access to nancial
aid positively a¤ects higher education enrollment, a result that may shed light on the existence of credit
constraints. The second group is focused on higher education returns and with them it is assessed whether
individuals who decided not to attend higher education would have obtained larger returns than those who
decided to attend.
Regarding the rst group, Kane (1996) suggests the existence of credit constraints on the U.S. higher
education access by analyzing tuition costs: in those states with higher tuition costs there is greater delay in
enrolling in higher education institutions. This can be understood as a previous saving process in order to
be able to fund higher education studies. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) conclude similar results via
simulations, where positive e¤ects on enrollment are found when relaxing nancial requirements of higher
education access.
Articles focusing on economic returns such as Cameron and Heckman (2001), Cameron and Taber (2004)
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and Kaufmann (2012), nd no evidence of credit constraints on higher education access in United States and
Mexico. The rst two articles suggest that ability constraints (or long run constraints) rather than credit
constraints (or short run constraints) are the main determinants behind the decision of attending to a higher
education institution. Kaufmann (2012) uses a survey of economic returns that individuals expect to have
in the future in order to identify the existence of credit constraints in Mexico, concluding that those who
are at the margin of attending or not to a higher education institution would have larger economic returns
than those who are attending, implying the presence of credit constraints.
Our article is based on the methodology proposed in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) for estimating
marginal returns of higher education, and contributes to the existing literature by considering unobserved
heterogeneity and rich administrative data. This is important since previous reported evidence utilizes
methods such OLS and instrumental variables, which may conduct to misleading conclusions or results
which heavily depend upon the considered instrument (Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil, 2006).1
Unlike previous studies, this paper tests the existence of credit constraints in higher education access by
comparing the actual economic returns of individuals who attended to it with those of who are at the margin
of attending to it, in the context of unobserved heterogeneity models (Willis and Rosen, 1979; Card, 1994,
1995; Taber, 2001, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil, 2006; Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2010, 2011; Kaufmann, 2012). In order to identify individuals, and following Carneiro, Heckman
and Vytlacil (2011), our empirical strategy consists in simulating marginal changes in di¤erent policies so
we can identify who are at the margin of attending or not to a higher education institution. Thus, by using
the Marginal Treatment E¤ect methodology (MTE, see more details in Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999, 2005;
Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil, 2006) we estimate the economic returns of this group and then compare it
with the estimated returns of those who attend a higher education institution.
The intuition behind our empirical strategy follows the idea posed in Carneiro and Heckman (2002). If
individuals that are at the margin of attending (or not) a higher education institution obtain larger economic
returns than those of individuals who attend a higher education institution, then the formers are facing an
unobservable barrier (for the econometrician) in the access to higher education, such as credit constraints.
This approach is directly related to what is presented in articles such as Becker (1967), Willis and Rosen
(1979) and Card (1994), in which these constraints are modeled as self-specic interest rates (individuals who
face greater interest rates will have more di¢ culties obtaining resources to nance their higher education
studies).
1To be more precise, di¤erent groups will be induced to attend to a higher education institution depending on the considered
instrument. These groups will not necessarily be the same. Clearly this introduces problems in the adequate identication of
the relevant treatment e¤ects.
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The specic application presented in this work is the Chilean case, for which we use a rich administrative
database composed of three sources: data of enrollment and graduation from the Chilean higher education
system, test scores and labor market outcomes from the Chilean Unemployment Insurance database. Our
results show that individuals with lower unobservable costs of attending a higher education institution
obtain greater economic returns. When considering more exible function forms we are unable to reject
the hypothesis of null (or even negative) economic returns for individuals with high unobservable costs of
attending higher education. Furthermore, our results show that, given the current nancial aid scheme
of grants and credits, the returns of those who are at the margin of attending or not a higher education
institution are lower than of those who decided to attend. This result holds even when considering di¤erent
policy changes and di¤erent functional forms. Nevertheless, when conditioning on di¤erent family income
levels, we nd some evidence of credit constraints for higher income families. It is important to notice that
our analysis is performed for cohorts who started to study in 2006, when a massive program of student loans
was starting (the State Guaranteed Loan, see Rau, Rojas and Urzúa, 2013, for further details) and before
the large increase in the number of grants for higher education, which started in 2011.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Institutional background of the Chilean Higher
Education System Section 3 describes the proposed model to be estimated, along with the corresponding
assumptions. Section 4 describes the datasets and presents descriptive statistics of our sample. Section 5
shows the practical issues that arise when estimating the type of models that we use and Section 6 presents
the basic results of our estimation. Finally, Section 7 put forward some concluding remarks.
2 The Case of the Chilean Higher Education System: Institutional
Background
In Chile once graduated from high school, individuals are able to choose between entering the labor market or
attending to a higher education institution. In case they decide the second alternative, individuals must take
national standarized test, the University Selection Test (Prueba de Selección Universitaria, PSU).2 This test
is required by most higher education institutions in Chile. According to the Chilean Ministry of Education,
nearly 96% of the high school graduates take this test and hence it seems reasonable to consider individuals
who have taken it in our sample.
2The University Selection Test assesses the students skills once they graduate from high school. This test considers two
mandatory sections (Mathematics and Language) and two optional sections (Sciences and History), of which the student must
take at least one of them. The scores range from 150 to 850 points.
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Higher education institutions are divided into three groups: Universities, Professional Institutes and
Technical Institutes. The main di¤erence between these institutions relies on the o¤ered certication level.
Universities grant bachelor, professional and graduate degrees, Professional Institutes are able to grant
technical and professional degrees, and Technical Institutes grant technical degrees. Table 1 presents the
total undergraduate enrollment by type of higher education institution. We see that an important fraction
of total undergraduate enrollment, 62%, is focused in Universities, followed by Professional and Technical
Institutes, with 25% and 13% of the total enrollment, respectively.
Although higher education access was quite uneven for several groups (Espinoza et al., 2006), in the last
years this trend has changed due to the increase in the number of student aids (grants and loans) for the
most vulnerable sectors, especially after the implementation of the Chilean State Guaranteed Loan in year
2006. Most of the nancial aid are conditional on a minimum PSU score (generally over 475 points in the
Math and Language tests, or at least a 5.3 GPA (out of 7.0) in high school in the case of Professional or
Technical Institutes) and income levels.3 Table 2 shows the main grants and loans available in 2006, with a
description and requirements in order to be eligible.
The increase in the number of nancial aids has had a positive e¤ect in higher education enrollment, as
Figures 1 and 2 present. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that there has been a substantial growth in the coverage
of nancial aids for lower income sectors. It is important to notice that, as detailed below, our analysis
considers the cohort that enrolled in higher education institutions in 2006 and hence students face a di¤erent
context of grants and loans (which is before the large increase in the number of nancial aids).
What is stated above raises the following question: were credit constraints present in higher education
access in the Chilean context?. This paper assesses this question for the period right before the large
increase in nancial aids. If the answer would have been "no", then the important increment in credits and
scholarships from 2006-2012 would had been allocated to individuals without credit constraints with the
subsequent opportunity cost of scal resources. Alternatively, if no credit constraints in higher education
access are found, then economic resources may have been handed over to individuals whose optimal decision
may have been not to attend a higher education institution.4 In the case that credit constraints were present
in the higher education system, more resources focused on the most needed sectors would have been justied.
3The Chilean grade scale ranges from 1.0 to 7.0, where 4.0 is the minimum passing grade.
4Reyes, Rodríguez and Urzúa (2013) nds evidence in Chile of negative returns to higher education for a certain group of
individuals.
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3 Estimating Marginal Returns to Higher Education under Un-
observed Heterogeneity
In order to test for the existence of credit constraints in higher education access we consider a generalized
Roy model (Roy, 1951), following Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005), Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006)
and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011). Assume two possible higher education scenarios. In the rst
one individuals that graduate from high school take a national standardized university admissions test and
do not enroll in a higher education institution. In the second scenario we have the same individuals but who
nally enrolle in a higher education institution and graduate from it.5 The equations that determine the
level of wages in this context are the following:
W1 = 1(X) + U1 (1)
W0 = 0(X) + U0 (2)
Where W1 and W0 are the wages that individuals who attended, and did not, to a higher education
institution perceive, respectively, 1(X) is a function that determines wages for those who decided to attend
higher education, X is a vector of observable characteristics that a¤ect wages and 0(X) is a function that
determines wages for those individuals who did not attend higher education. Finally, U1 and U0 are error
components that a¤ect wages of the individuals who pursued, and did not, not higher education, respectively.
Thus, the higher education return will be given by R = E(W1 W0jX) = 1(X) 0(X)+E(U1 U0jX): In
order to be able to model this return we must analyze the part of the equation that depends on the selection
of individuals (E(U1   U0jX) 6= 0). We assume that the decision of attending or not to higher education is
modeled by the following rule:
A =
8>><>>:
1 if A > 0
0 if A  0
Where the decision of attending, A, is equal to 1 if the individual attends to a higher education institution
and 0 if this is not the case (i.e. to attend and graduate from higher education will be our treatment). Thus,
we have that W = A W1 + (1  A) W0. The decision variable depends upon a latent variable, A, which
determines the utility level that the individual will perceive in both scenarios. We model this latent utility
5We exclude from our analysis those who enrolled in a higher education institution and later dropped out and those who do
not take the PSU test.
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as follows:
A = Z   V (3)
Where Z is a vector of observable variables that a¤ect the decision of attending (and graduating) to a
higher education institution or not,  is a parameter that measures how relevant are the previously mentioned
variables on the studied choice and V is an unobservable component. Vector Z contains instruments that
a¤ect the decision of attending (or not) to a higher education institution, and that are excluded from the wage
equations. It is important to emphasize that in order to identify the treatment parameter the assumption
ZjX ? U1; U0; V must be met. The instruments that we consider would meet this condition, as we will detail
below.
Thus, following Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006) it is possible to dene the probability of being
treated (propensity score) as:
Pr(A = 1; Z) = Pr

V
2V
<
Z
2V

= 

Z
2V

= P (Z)
In order to identify the treatment e¤ect for those individuals who are at the margin of being treated
or not, we must estimate the e¤ect that the treatment would have on wages for di¤erent margins (i.e. for
di¤erent levels of propensity scores). In this sense, articles such as Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005),
Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) suggest to estimate the
Marginal Treatment E¤ect (MTE), which depends on the probability of being treated. The propensity score,
as detailed in Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006), is very important in the context of instrumental variables
since it satises the independence and monotonicity conditions of Imbens and Angrist (1994).
It is important to redene the choice equation in terms of observables and unobservables:
A =
8>><>>:
1 if P (Z)  UA > 0
0 if P (Z)  UA  0
Where UA = 

V
2V

. Thus, we can dene the MTE as:
MTE(X = x;UA = uA) = E(RjX = x; UA = uA)
We see that the MTE will take di¤erent values depending on the levels of unobservable UA, that can
be interpreted as the desire of attending to higher education (Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011). It is
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important to note the fact that individuals with greater values of UA are those that have lower probabilities
of being treated. Thus, given that our analysis is based on the support of UA, we can identify the individuals
that would be induced to attend a higher education institution when marginal changes in the propensity
score are made.
3.1 Normal Specication
For the wage equations di¤erent structures can be assumed, some of which are more restrictive than the
others. Firstly, we start with the more restrictive parametric case for which it is possible to assume the
structure of a normal model as specied below:
W1 = 1 + '+X1 + U1 (4)
W0 = 0 +X0 + U0 (5)
We assume that the unobserved components are not independent between them, even when conditioning
on observables (U1 ? U0 ? V jX does not occur). We assume that the unobserved components follow a
trivariate normal distribution:
(U1; U0; V )  N(0;)
Where  is the covariance matrix of the error components. We dene the variance of the error component
Ui as 2i (for i = 1; 2) and for component V as 
2
V . On the other hand, the covariance between component
Ui and component V is given by i;V (for i = 1; 2) and for components Ui and Uj by 2i;j . According to this
specication, the denition of the MTE can be rewritten as:
E(RjX = x; UA = uA) = 1 + '  0 + x(1   0) + (1   0) 1 (uA) (6)
Where 1 =
1;V
2V
and 0 =
0;V
2V
. We consider that Z
2V
=  1 (P (Z)), that E(W1jA = 1; X; Z) =
1 + '+X1 + 1 

 (
 1(P (Z)))
P (Z)

and E(W0jA = 0; X; Z) = 0 +X0 + 0 
( 1(P (Z)))
1 P (Z) :
6 Heckman,
Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006) suggest two stages in order to estimate the MTE in the normal model context:
(1) Estimate the propensity score through a probit estimation and then construct the predicted probabilities
for each individual and (2) replace these probabilities in the MTE equation and estimate it by OLS.
6See Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) y Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006) for more details.
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3.2 Semiparametric Specication
A second specication considers a less restrictive structure. Following Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006),
this structure is given by:
E(W jX = x; P (Z) = p) = x0 + (x(1   0))p+K(p) (7)
Where K(p) is a control function, in the sense of Heckman and Robb (1985) and K(p) = E(U1 U0jA =
1; P (Z) = p). For this structure, the MTE will be given by the following equation:
MTE(X = x; UA = p) =
@E(W jX = x; P (Z) = p)
@p
= x(1   0) +
@K(p)
@p
(8)
It is possible to semiparametrically estimate the previous expression in two stages (Heckman, Urzúa and
Vytlacil, 2006; Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011). In a rst stage we can assume that the function
K(p) is a polynomial of degree k of the propensity score.7 By using the estimated parameters in the rst
stage we can now parametrically estimate K(p). For this we run a local quadratic regression of fW =
W   xc0 + (x( \1   0))bp on bp, with what is possible to obtain the level and the derivatives of K(p), using
the approach proposed in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998).8 This assumes that fW = K(p) + v.
With the estimated parameters it is possible to construct the MTE.
3.3 Identication of the Relevant Economic Returns
In order to test for the existence of credit constraints in higher education access we must estimate the returns
of those who attended and graduated from it (the treated group) and of those who are at the margin of being
treated or not. The answer for the latter group is not trivial. A priori it is not possible to dene the group
of individuals that are at the margin. For this, it is necessary to simulate a policy change (for example,
reducing average tuition costs, increasing the number of higher education institutions or the average hourly
wage for high school graduates, among other changes) in order to assess which individuals would be induced
to receive or not the treatment.
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) dene the Policy Relevant Treatment E¤ect (PRTE) as a function of the
7We consider a degree 4 polynomial (i.e. k = 4). As a robustness check we also considered degree 3 and 5 polynomials. The
results that we obtain appear to be robust to the degree of the polynomial.
8Following Carneiro, Heckman y Vytlacil (2011), we consider 26 equally spaced points in the common support of the
propensity score (from 0.002 to 0.929), in order to run a local quadratic regression (we use a gaussian kernel). For the optimal
bandwidth selection we follow the Residual Squares criterion, proposed in Fan and Gijbels (1996). The optimal bandwidth is
0.1348.
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MTE:9
PRTE =
E(W )  E(W )
E(A)  E(A) =
1Z
0
MTE(uA)!PRTE(uA)duA (9)
Where !PRTE(uA) =
FP (uA) FP (uA)
EFP (P ) EFP (P )
is the weight that is given to the MTE, which depends on the
policy change. In this case E(W ) is the expected wage of an individual once the policy change is made,
E(W ) is the expected wage under the base policy, E(A) is the average probability of being treated in
the new scenario and E(A) is the probability of being treated on the base scenario. FP and FP are the
cumulative distribution functions of the probability of being treated, with and without the policy change,
respectively, while EFP (P ) is the expected value of the probability of being treated under the new scenario,
which is equivalent in the case of the base scenario.
By using the parameters of the structural model we calculate theTreatment on the Treated (TT), which
is equivalent to the economic return that the treated obtained. Following Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), the
TT can be dened as a function of the MTE and is specied by the following equation:
TT =
1Z
0
MTE(uA)!TT(uA)duA (10)
Where !TT(uA) =
R 1
uA
f(a)da
E(A) , f(a) is the probability density of being treated and E(A) is the expected
probability of being treated. Since we do not have a full common support for the propensity score, it is not
possible to identify the TT according to the semiparametric model. However, we follow Carneiro, Heckman
and Vytlacil (2011) and estimate it by re-calibrating the weights, so they add up to 1 in the support that
we will work in.
Regarding the estimation of the conditional probability density function, which is necessary for the
construction of the weights, it is important to notice the following. The multidimensionality of X introduces
a problem at the moment of estimating the conditional density of the propensity score. Given this, following
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010, 2011), we condition on an index X( \1   0) instead of conditioning
on X.10
9We supress the conditioning on X for the sake of simplicity.
10 In the estimation of the conditional density function f(P jX) we folow Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010). We estimate a
local linear regression of 1
h
K
 bp p
h

on the index X( \1   0), where K() is a gaussian kernel and h = 1:06(dV ar(P ))1=2 n 1=5.
For the local linear regression we consider a bandwidth equal to h = 1:06  (dV ar(X(1   0)))1=2  n 1=5:
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With these two parameters it is possible to test if the PRTE is greater than the TT. If this is the case,
then this could be an indication of the presence of credit constraints.
It is important to note that, as Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010) shows, in those cases in which
a full support for the propensity score is not reached, it is not possible to identify the PRTE. Instead, the
Marginal Policy Relevant Treatment E¤ect (MPRTE) is proposed. The MPRTE allows to identify the e¤ects
of marginal changes in policies despite not having a full common support. This is also an important di¤erence
of the approach followed in this work with that pursued in previous articles applied to similar contexts, such
as Kaufmann (2012) that use the PRTE even when a full common support is not present.
The MPRTE assumes marginal changes in policies and is dened as follows:
MPRTE =
1Z
0
MTE(uA)!MPRTE(uA)duA (11)
Where:
!MPRTE(uA) =  
@
@F0(uA)
@
@EF0(A)
(12)
The denition of the weight depends on the type of policy change that is simulated. For instance, if a
marginal increase in the probability of attending to a higher education institution is simulated, p(t) = t+ ,
then the relevant weight will be !MPRTE(u) = fA(u) while in the case that a proportional increase in
the probability of attending to a higher education institution, p(t) = (1 + )t, the relevant weight will
be !MPRTE(u) = ufA(u)=E(A): It is also possible to simulate scenarios where marginal changes in an
instrument are made, as a marginal increase in the average tuition costs, for example. Assuming that the
instrument is the jth element in the Z vector, a policy of the type Zj = Z
j +  will have a weight equal
to !MPRTE(u) = fA(u)fV (F
 1
V (u))=E(fV (u)). All the relevant weights (including those of other treatment
parameters, such as the Average Treatment E¤ect, ATE, and the Treatment on the Untreated, TUT) are
presented in Tables 6 and 7.11
11Notice that the treatment parameters and even the instrumental variable estimations can be written as weighted average
of the MTE. For more details see Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006).
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data we use consider several sources. First, we use information from the administrative registry of the
University Selection Test (PSU). This database contains information of individuals who took the test by late
2005, such as test scores and socioeconomic characteristics. Second, we use administrative information of
enrollment in higher education institutions from 2007 to 2010. With this set of information we determined
who took the PSU in 2005 and were enrolled in a higher education institution in those years.12
A third source of information is the administrative database of higher education graduates between 2007
and 2011. With this information we were able to determine which of the individuals that took the PSU 2005
graduated from a higher education institution in that time window. According to this rich and complete
database, we determined our two groups of interest: (i) those who took the PSU in 2005 and never enrolled
in a higher education institution (untreated group) and (ii) those who took the PSU in 2005, enrolled in a
higher education institution and graduated from it (treated group).13
Finally, in order to obtain wages we merged our database with administrative data from the Chilean
Unemployment Insurance system. This database contains information of dependent workers who have found
a job or changed their jobs since october 2002, in addition to all workers who voluntarily a¢ liated to the
system.14 With this database we were able to add the average wage between january and november 2012 for
both groups.15 Our nal sample has 36,376 observations of which 12,072 are treated individuals and 24,304
untreated.
Tables 8 and 9 present descriptive statistics of the variables used in the choice and in the wage equations.
In the case of the choice equation we include PSU test scores (high school grades, math and language scores)
as proxies of ability and their squares so we can capture any non-linear relations that may exist (Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011), a gender dummy (that is equal to 1 is the individual is male and 0 otherwise),
age and geographical location dummies where living in the center of the country is the baseline.16 We also
include in the choice equation dummies that account for type of school (where having studied in a public
school is the base case), dummies of parentseducation and of gross family income, which are divided into
12Since we do not have information for 2006, we observe individuals who took the PSU in 2005, enrolled in a higher education
in 2006 and did not dropout from it in that year. We are also able to observe those who took the PSU in 2005 and were not
enrolled in 2007 in a higher education institution. It is important to note that this sample of students is quite stable in time.
13Other groups were not considered in the estimation.
14According to information of the Chilean Superintendence of Pensions, in 2012 nearly 94% of the dependent workers were
a¢ liated to the Unemployment Insurance system.
15Given the high dispersion of wages we trimmed the highest and lowest 1% of wages in our sample.
16The information that we have regarding the regions of the country is before the new delimitation. In the old delimitation
Chile is divided in 13 regions. We dene north from the rst to the fourth region, the center from the fth to the seventh region
plus the thirteenth region and the south from the eighth to the twelfth region.
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3 categories (from 0 to $278.000 CLP, $278.000 to $834.000 CLP and more than $834.000 CLP) and where
the baseline is the lowest level of family income.17 We also include the size of the familiar group at the
moment that the individual becomes a high school graduate and a dummy that indicates if the individual
studied a non technical program in high school (the baseline is the case that the individual studied a technical
program).
We consider di¤erent variables as instruments in the choice equation (and that are excluded from the
wage equations, as suggested by Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 2011). According to this article, to consider
several instruments allows us to expand the range in which the MTE is identied. A rst instrument is the
average tuition cost of a higher education institution in the region that the individual lives in at the moment
of taking the PSU. This variable a¤ects the decision of attending or not to a higher education institution, as
Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001), Kane and Rouse (1995) and Kaufmann (2012) suggest. Additionally,
we include the number of higher education institutions that existed in each region by 2005, year in which
individuals were nishing their high school studies. This variable is related to the number of this type of
institutions in the region and could a¤ect the assessed decision. It is important to note that this variable
is similar to the one considered in Card (1995) and Cameron and Taber (2004), which is the presence of a
higher education institution near the studentshousehold.
Another type of instruments that are considered in the literature are related to labor market variables.
This is due to the fact that local economic conditions may a¤ect the opportunity cost of those who are
deciding to attend or not to higher education. Also, as noted in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011),
labor market variables may a¤ect the wages that the individual may perceive. Hence, we include in the
wage equations the average log wage for each region in 2012. For the choice equation we include the average
hourly wage for individuals aged between 19 and 24, for each region, which are constructed using the 2006
CASEN survey. Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cameron and Taber (2004) consider similar variables to
this one in their analyses. We include in the choice equation the average unemployment rate in 2005 for each
region, following Cameron and Heckman (1998). Since it is likely that these instruments may be correlated
with some socioeconomic variables (Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011), we include interactions of them
with PSU test scores and their squares family income categories, parentseducation and size of the familiar
group.
In the case of the wage equations we include test scores and their squares, geographical location dummies,
age, gender dummy, information related with the type of program that the individual followed in high school
17 In 2006 1 US Dollar was equivalent to $530.2 CLP.
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(i.e. technical or non technical), cumulative number of contributions to the Unemployment Insurance by
2011 (as a proxy of labor market experience) and, as mentioned previously, the average of the log wage in
each region in 2012.
We see that the group that decided to attend a higher education institution obtains better test scores
(in the PSU) and has a higher probability of living in the south of the country. We also see that this group
come from wealthier households and that their parents are on average more educated than their peers that
did not attend higher education. It is possible to observe that the untreated group is slightly older than the
treated one and that the formers are on average more men relative to women. Finally, we see that those who
decided to attend higher education come, with a higher likelihood, from private and private-voucher schools,
and from smaller familiar groups than of those who did not attend higher education.
The untreated individuals have a higher probability of having studied a technical program at high school
(in relation to the treated group) and more contributions to the Unemployment Insurance system. No
important di¤erences are acknowledged in relation to the average wage in 2012 in regions. We observe that
who did not attend a higher education institution faced higher average tuition costs and lower unemployment
rates in their regions. We see that those who attended to higher education faced lower average hourly wages
in 2005 and that slightly lower number of higher education institutions were present in the regions they lived
in 2005.
5 Results
The estimation results of the choice equation are presented in Tables 10 and 11.18 We see that the test
scores and their squares do not have a signicant e¤ect on the probability of attending to a higher education
institution. The large number of interactions that we include capture these e¤ects. We also see that
individuals who live in the north and south of the country are more likely to attend higher education than
their peers who live at the center of the country, and that the greater the family income, the greater the
probability of being treated. We see that parentsschooling years does not have a statistically signicant
e¤ect on the choice decision (again, caused by the large number of interactions that we include) while older
and male individuals are less likely to study in higher education. It is possible to observe that attending to
a public school and coming from a larger family reduces the probability of attending to a higher education
18Due to reasons of space, we omit the 60 coe¢ cients of the interactions between instruments and socioeconomic variables.
Results are available upon request.
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institution. Students who studied technical programs in high school have lower probabilities of studying in
higher education.
Regarding the instruments, we see that higher tuition costs and higher unemployment rates reduce the
probability of attending to a higher education institution. The latter may caused by economic problems in
studentshouseholds and hence they are pushed to join the labor market. We see that higher hourly wages
for individuals aged between 19 and 24 reduce the probability of attending to a higher education institution
(higher opportunity cost), and that a larger number of higher education institutions in the region that the
individuals resides increases the probability of attending to them. The propensity scores are presented in
Figure 3. The common support of the propensity score is between 0.002 and 0.929.
Table 12 presents the results of the estimation of the wage equations when a normal model is considered.
We observe that the math test score is a strong predictor of wages, where higher test scores lead to higher
wages, and that those who live at the north and south of the country obtain higher and lower wages than
those of who live in the center, respectively. Older and male individuals earn higher wages. Having studied
a non technical program in high school increases wages as well as having a larger number of cumulative
contributions. We see that the log wages in 2012 en each region are strongly correlated with higher wages.
Finally, we see that the coe¢ cients that correspond to the propensity scores are positive and statistically
signicant.
The results of the semiparametric estimation of the wage equations are presented in Tables 13 and 14. It
is important to note that in these results the function K(p) is approximated by a degree 4 polynomial of the
propensity score. We also present the results of the interactions of the propensity score and the mentioned
regressions.
The estimated MTEs according to the wage equation parameters of each specication are presented in
Figures 4 and 5 (both are conditioned in the mean ofX). We observe that a negative slope exists in both cases,
which suggests that individuals with higher levels of the unobservable uA (i.e. those with lower probabilities
of attending to a higher education institution) obtain lower returns to higher education. Magnitudes of
the MTEs di¤er signicantly between specications. We see that in the case of the semiparametric model
there are individuals for whom is not possible to reject the hypothesis of null or even negative returns to
higher education.19 This results goes in line with what other articles have found in the Chilean context,
19This does not occurs in the case of the normal model. These results show the importance of considering more exible
functional forms in the estimation.
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such as Reyes, Rodríguez and Urzúa (2013), in which negative returns for some individuals have also been
documented.
With the purpose of analyzing with greater detail the estimations of the MTEs, we estimate local treat-
ment parameters, di¤erent LATEs (Imbens and Angrist, 1994), in order to assess the economic returns to
higher education as a function of diverse values of unobserved costs. For this, we consider the results obtained
from the semiparametric specication, due to its greater exibility. Table 15 presents the estimation results
and the corresponding domain. We see that the returns to higher education decrease as greater values of UA
are achieved. In some cases we can not reject the hypothesis of negative returns.
We test the hypothesis of selection in gains. In the case of the normal model we test the hypothesis
1 = 0, which we reject (i.e. there is selection in gains). In the case of the semiparametric specication we
test the joint hypothesis of equality of all LATEs. Table 16 presents the results of the joint test, in addition
to equality tests of the adjacent LATEs.20 We can see that we reject the hypothesis that all LATEs are
equal, a result that evidences the existence of selection in gains. Additionally we can observe that for the
LATEs that correspond to lower levels of UA, we can not reject the hypothesis of equality while the opposite
occurs in the case of higher values of the unobservable, where the selection in gains happens to be strong
among adjacent LATEs.
5.1 Testing the Existence of Credit Constraints in Higher Education Access
As introduced in previous sections, in order to analyze whether credit constraints in higher education access
exist, it is necessary to compare the returns of those individuals who attended higher education with those
who are at the margin of attending or not. The parameters of interest as the ATE, TT, TUT and di¤erent
types of MPRTEs are presented in Table 17 (the estimated conditional probability density function, which
is necessary for calculating the weights of the treatment paramaters, is presented in Figure 6) .We observe
that under the normal model the returns to higher education of those who did not attend a higher education
institution are quite large (81%) and statistically signicant, while the semiparametric specication yields
substantially lower returns (10% for individuals who did not attend a higher education institution) that
do not achieve statistical signicance. A similar result can be seen in the case in which we consider the
complete population, where important di¤erences are acknowledged depending on the specication. These
results evidence the convenience of using exible functional forms.
Regarding the returns of those who are at the margin of attending higher education, measured by di¤erent
20We follow Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) for the estimation of the p-values of these tests.
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policy changes, results show that the returns are quite high and heterogenous, and slightly lower when the
semiparametric model is taken into account.
Although the heterogeneity present in the MPRTEs, we see that they are never greater than the TT. A
formal test is presented in Table 18. In it, we test the null hypothesis of TT =MPRTE. The results reject
all of these hypotheses.
5.1.1 Credit Constraints and Household Income
Household income is an important determinant at the moment of deciding to attend or not higher education.
Households with lower income levels will face more di¢ culties at the moment this decision is taken. In this
section, we test the existence of credit constraints in higher education access for two groups of individuals:
(1) those who belong to households with an income between $0 and $278,000 CLP (category 1 of income
level) and those with an income between $278,000 and $834,000 CLP (category 2 of income level) and (2)
those who belong to households with an income of at least $834,000 CLP (category 3 income level). These
income categories are measured at the moment individuals face the decision of attending or not a higher
education institution.
We repeat the same exercise that was performed in the previous section. We estimate conditional prob-
ability density functions for both groups, in order to calculate the weights of the treatment parameters.
Figures 7 and 8 present the density estimations. On the other hand, Figures 9 and 10 show the estimated
MTEs according to the normal model, for both groups. Figures 11 and 12 present the equivalent in the case
of the semiparametric specication. We see important di¤erences in relation to returns to higher education,
where individuals from higher income households obtain higher returns, no matter the specication that is
considered.
The treatment parameters according to di¤erent specications and household income categories are pre-
sented in Tables 19 and 20. We observe that the treatment parameters di¤er signicantly in terms of
magnitude and statistical signicance. In this sense the semiparametric model yields more credible results.
Finally, Tables 21 and 22 show the results of the hypothesis test TT = MPRTE for each group. In
Table 21 we see that in the case of the normal model all of the hypotheses are rejected, for those who
belong to the rst group. However, when considering the semiparametric specication we see that although
all of the hypotheses are rejected with a 93% of condence, these rejections are not as evident as in the
normal specication. Table 22 presents the results for the second group. Similar results are obtained when
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considering the normal specication. However, when the semiparametric model is taken into account we see
that we can not reject the null hypothesis in one case, p-value equal to 0.207, and a p-value about 0.06 is
obtained in the other case.
These results show that the presence of credit constraints in higher education access is not evident for
individuals from the rst, low income, group. This is not the case for the higher income group for which some
evidence of credit constraints is observed. This latter result may indicate that the increase of grants and
loans of 2006 was necessary, although the impact of the magnitude spent is not clear. Future research should
assess the e¤ects of the large increase of grants and loans between 2006 and 2012 on credit constraints. In
the case that no credit constraints were found, a feasible hypothesis, from an economic point of view, would
be that a further increase in grants and loans would not be required (ceteris paribus).
6 Concluding Remarks
The recent expansion of nancial aids for higher education, which has turned out to be an international
phenomenon, calls to take this cautiously, especially in a context of limited scal resources. This is due to
the fact that the scal burden may heavily increase and that public resources may have been delivered to
individuals who may have privately obtained them. Thus, a reasonable objective is expanding these aids to
individuals who are credit constrained.
The di¢ culty for identifying credit constrained individuals has lead to the development of di¤erent
approaches in order to do so. Articles such as Kane (1996, 2007), Cameron and Heckman (2001), and
Rau, Rojas and Urzúa (2013) are focused on assessing the e¤ects that the access to nancial aids has on
the probability of enrolling in higher education. Others like Carneiro and Heckman (2002), Cameron and
Taber (2004) and Kaufmann (2012), consider the analysis of higher education returns in order to assess the
existence of credit constraints.
Unlike previous works, this article tests the existence of credit constraints in higher education access
by considering actual marginal returns to education, in a context of unobserved heterogeneity. This is an
important contribution to a literature in which no concluding results exist. In order to test the existence of
credit constraints we compare the returns to higher education of those who attended it with those of who
are at the margin of attending it. Our argument follows the intuition of Carneiro and Heckman (2002): if
individuals that are at the margin of attending to a higher education institution had larger returns than
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those that are actually attending to it, then the formers would have faced unobservable barriers in the access
to higher education, that may be interpreted as credit constraints.
In our empirical strategy we simulate diverse marginal policy changes in order to identify individuals
who are at the margin of attending (or not) higher education. Thus, by considering the Marginal Treatment
E¤ect (MTE) presented in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) and Heckman, Urzúa and Vytlacil (2006),
we estimate the economic returns to higher education of this group and then compare them with those of
who decided to attend a higher education institution. We consider a complete administrative database that
includes information from national standardized test scores (the University Selection Test) in 2005, higher
education enrollment and graduate registries and wages that individuals earned between 2007 and 2012, from
the Chilean Unemployment Insurance system.
Our results suggest the existence of selection in gains. That is, individuals with lower unobservable costs
of attending a higher education institution experiment larger economic returns. Additionally, conditional
on the existing situation in Chile in 2006 and before the large expansion in grants and loans that occurred
between 2006 and 2012, the returns of those who are at the margin are lower than those of who decided
to attend higher education. This result is robust to di¤erent simulations of policy changes and to di¤erent
functional forms. Hence, no evidence of credit constraints in higher education can be acknowledged However,
when conditioning on household income levels, we nd that for higher income households some evidence of
credit constraints is found, although it is not categorical. These results would seem to support the large
expansion of nancial aids that occurred between 2006 and 2012 in Chile. Future research should assess if
credit constraints are still present, given the actual context of grants and loans, and hence provide empirical
evidence that supports or oppose a new expansion of nancial aids.
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Tables
Table 1: Higher Education Enrollment According to Type of Institution (2011)
Type of Institution Number of Students %
Technical Institue 138,635 13.0%
Professional Institue 267,766 25.1%
University 661,862 62.0%
Total 1,068,263 100%
Source: Chilean Ministry of Education.
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Table 3: Coverage of Higher Education Grants by Quintiles of Income
Quintile Year
2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
I 20.2% 14.9% 21.1% 23.3% 37.1%
II 9.5% 13.0% 17.8% 23.8% 26.2%
III 9.5% 13.2% 13.0% 18.6% 25.3%
IV 5.7% 10.8% 11.8% 13.3% 18.9%
V 1.8% 7.0% 8.5% 8.4% 11.1%
Total 6.3% 10.4% 12.5% 15.3% 21.4%
Source: Authorselaboration based on CASEN 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011 surveys.
Table 4: Coverage of Higher Education Loans by Quintiles of Income
Quintile Year
2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
I 37.5% 40.2% 45.2% 46.3% 56.5%
II 39.3% 44.0% 42.8% 45.9% 52.4%
III 35.7% 34.8% 35.4% 44.7% 46.7%
IV 27.0% 28.7% 36.3% 38.1% 39.8%
V 13.1% 16.4% 21.0% 18.2% 27.0%
Total 25.7% 27.9% 33.0% 34.9% 41.7%
Source: Authorselaboration based on CASEN 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011 surveys.
Table 5: Coverage of Higher Education Grants or Loans by Quintiles of Income
Quintile Year
2000 2003 2006 2009 2011
I 50.5% 48.5% 56.2% 57.4% 71.6%
II 44.1% 51.1% 52.1% 57.3% 63.0%
III 39.0% 42.7% 42.3% 53.4% 56.3%
IV 30.1% 34.6% 41.8% 44.3% 49.5%
V 14.2% 22.7% 27.7% 24.4% 33.7%
Total 28.8% 34.7% 40.0% 42.8% 51.3%
Source: Authorselaboration based on CASEN 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011 surveys.
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Table 6: Weights for Treatment Parameters
Parameter Weight
Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE) !ATE(x; u) = 1
Treatment on the Treated (TT) !TT (x; u) =
hR 1
u f(ajX = x)da
i
1
E(P jX=x)
Treatment on the Untreated (TUT) !TUT (x; u) =
R u
0 f(ajX = x)da

1
E(1 P jX=x)
Marginal Policy Relevant Treatment E¤ect (MPRTE) !MPRTE(x; u) =  
@
@
F0(ujX=x)
@
@
EF0 (AjX=x)
Source: Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010).
Table 7: Weights for Di¤erent MPRTEs
Type of Policy Weight
P = P +  !MPRTE(x; u) = fP jX(u)
P = P (1 + ) !MPRTE(x; u) =
ufP jX (u)
E(P jX)
Zj = Z
j +  !MPRTE(x; u) =
fP jX (u)fV jX

F 1
V jX (u)

E(fV jX (A(Z)jX))
Source: Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010).
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Attend Do not Attend
High School GPA 0.391 -0.194
(0.974) (0.951)
Language 0.455 -0.229
(0.939) (0.924)
Mathematics 0.449 -0.23
(0.971) (0.945)
North 0.104 0.127
(0.306) (0.333)
South 0.253 0.203
(0.435) (0.402)
Household Income ($278.000 - $834.000) 0.334 0.253
(0.472) (0.435)
Household Income ($834.000 and more) 0.14 0.055
(0.347) (0.228)
Fathers Education: Between 8 and 12 years 0.216 0.282
(0.411) (0.45)
Fathers Education: 12 years 0.349 0.353
(0.477) (0.478)
Fathers Education: More than 12 years 0.345 0.208
(0.475) (0.406)
Mothers Education: Between 8 and 12 years 0.235 0.322
(0.424) (0.467)
Mothers Education: 12 years 0.374 0.364
(0.484) (0.481)
Mothers Education: More than 12 years 0.303 0.163
(0.46) (0.37)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
26
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics (Continuation)
Variable Attend Do not Attend
Age 18.542 18.789
(1.724) (2.471)
Gender 0.386 0.519
(0.487) (0.5)
Private-Voucher School 0.467 0.433
(0.499) (0.496)
Private School 0.137 0.052
(0.343) (0.221)
Size of Familiar Group 4.796 4.932
(1.502) (1.67)
Non Technical Program 0.764 0.608
(0.425) (0.488)
Number of Cumulative Contributions 26.397 40.505
(17.512) (23.65)
Log Average Wage in Region (2012) 13.079 13.094
(0.168) (0.168)
Average Tuition Cost in Region 1.507 1.512
(0.173) (0.177)
Average Unemployment Rate in Region 0.074 0.073
(0.013) (0.012)
Average Hourly Wage (Aged 19-24, 2005) 1.877 1.899
(0.41) (0.41)
Number of Higher Education Institutions in Region 113.097 115.69
(79.839) (81.123)
Number of Observations 12,072 24,304
Notes: Standard deviations in parethnesis. The average tuition cost in the region is expressed in millions of Chilean pesos
while the average hourly wage for individuals aged between 19 and 24 years is expressed in thousands of Chilean pesos.
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Table 10: Choice Equation Estimation Results
Variable Coe¢ cient
High School GPA 0.361
(0.241)
Language -0.052
(0.292)
Mathematics -0.023
(0.297)
High School GPA (Squared) -0.153
(0.186)
Language (Squared) -0.239
(0.184)
Mathematics (Squared) -0.092
(0.188)
North 0.116
(0.04)
South 0.243
(0.029)
Household Income ($278.000 - $834.000) 0.682
(0.497)
Household Income ($834.000 and more) 2.611
(0.914)
Fathers Education: Between 8 and 12 years -0.482
(0.678)
Fathers Education: 12 years -0.822
(0.698)
Fathers Education: More than 12 years -1.058
(0.816)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Following Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), we include in the regression
interactions of the test scores (and their squares), household income categories, parents education and size of the familiar
group with the 4 considered instruments.
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Table 11: Choice Equation Estimation Results (Continuation)
Variable Coe¢ cient
Mothers Education: Between 8 and 12 years -0.542
(0.68)
Mothers Education: 12 years -0.955
(0.707)
Mothers Education: More than 12 years -0.878
(0.854)
Age -0.021
(0.004)
Gender -0.289
(0.016)
Private-Voucher School 0.101
(0.016)
Private School 0.126
(0.034)
Size of Familiar Group -0.37
(0.128)
Non Technical Program 0.157
(0.017)
Average Tuition Cost in Region -1.696
(0.515)
Average Unemployment Rate in Region -8.238
(3.51)
Average Hourly Wage (Aged 19-24, 2005) -0.986
(0.338)
Number of Higher Education Institutions in Region 0.008
(0.002)
Constant 3.909
(0.933)
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Following Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011), we include in the regression
interactions of the test scores (and their squares), household income categories, parents education and size of the familiar
group with the 4 considered instruments.
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Table 12: Wage Equations Estimation Results (Normal Model)
Variable Coe¢ cient
Treated Untreated
High School GPA 0.006 -0.007
(0.009) (0.005)
Language 0.009 -0.043
(0.011) (0.007)
Mathematics 0.123 0.043
(0.011) (0.008)
High School GPA (Squared) 0.007 0.001
(0.005) (0.003)
Language (Squared) -0.008 -0.009
(0.005) (0.003)
Mathematics (Squared) 0.034 0.017
(0.004) (0.004)
North 0.075 0.072
(0.019) (0.012)
South -0.03 -0.055
(0.015) (0.011)
Age 0.007 0.008
(0.003) (0.002)
Gender 0.078 0.173
(0.014) (0.01)
Non Technical Program -0.069 -0.066
(0.015) (0.009)
Cumulative Number of Contributions 0.006 0.009
(0.000) (0.000)
Log Average Wage in Region (2012) 0.358 0.390
(0.035) (0.025)
 0.165 0.334
(0.045) (0.039)
Constant 8.209 6.767
(0.462) (0.338)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 13: Wage Equations Estimation Results (Semiparametric Model)
Variable Coe¢ cient
High School GPA 0.006
(0.012)
Language -0.067
(0.019)
Mathematics 0.031
(0.02)
High School GPA (Squared) -0.001
(0.006)
Language (Squared) -0.021
(0.007)
Mathematics (Squared) 0.011
(0.007)
North 0.192
(0.02)
South -0.004
(0.019)
Age 0.002
(0.003)
Gender 0.28
(0.017)
Non Technical Program -0.060
(0.017)
Log Average Wage in Region (2012) 0.391
(0.043)
Cumulative Number of Contributions 0.010
(0.000)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 14: Wage Equations Estimation Results (Semiparametric Model), Continuation
Variable Coeciente
P^ (Z) High School GPA -0.017
(0.040)
P^ (Z) Language 0.106
(0.058)
P^ (Z)Mathematics 0.101
(0.058)
P^ (Z) High School GPA (Squared) 0.02
(0.016)
P^ (Z) Language (Squared) 0.015
(0.015)
P^ (Z)Mathematics (Squared) 0.036
(0.013)
P^ (Z) North -0.400
(0.058)
P^ (Z) South -0.110
(0.046)
P^ (Z) Age 0.035
(0.009)
P^ (Z) Gender -0.437
(0.046)
P^ (Z) Non Technical Program -0.078
(0.055)
P^ (Z) Log Average Wage in Region (2012) -0.06
(0.109)
P^ (Z) Number of Contributions -0.012
(0.001)
P^ (Z) 2.618
(1.578)
P^ (Z)2 -3.073
(1.887)
P^ (Z)3 4.813
(2.852)
P^ (Z)4 -3.228
(1.590)
Constant 6.702
(0.573)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 15: Estimation Results for di¤erent LATEs
Range of UA LATE
0.003 - 0.040 1.198
(0.035)
0.077 - 0.114 1.216
(0.232)
0.151 - 0.188 1.160
(0.143)
0.225 - 0.262 1.050
(0.082)
0.299 - 0.336 0.917
(0.061)
0.374 - 0.411 0.789
(0.081)
0.448 - 0.485 0.681
(0.113)
0.522 - 0.559 0.590
(0.149)
0.596 - 0.633 0.477
(0.190)
0.670 - 0.707 0.256
(0.244)
0.744 - 0.782 -0.179
(0.323)
0.819 - 0.856 -0.894
(0.444)
0.893 - 0.930 -1.863
(0.642)
Note: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis and were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 16: Test of Equality of LATEs
Null Hypothesis P-Value
LATE0:003 0:040 = LATE0:077 0:114 0.895
LATE0:077 0:114 = LATE0:151 0:188 0.586
LATE0:151 0:188 = LATE0:225 0:262 0.153
LATE0:225 0:262 = LATE0:299 0:336 0.029
LATE0:299 0:336 = LATE0:374 0:411 0.012
LATE0:374 0:411 = LATE0:448 0:485 0.023
LATE0:448 0:485 = LATE0:522 0:559 0.067
LATE0:522 0:559 = LATE0:596 0:633 0.055
LATE0:596 0:633 = LATE0:670 0:707 0.008
LATE0:670 0:707 = LATE0:744 0:782 0.000
LATE0:744 0:782 = LATE0:819 0:856 0.000
LATE0:819 0:856 = LATE0:893 0:930 0.000
Joint Test 0.000
Note: P-values were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications, following Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011).
Table 17: Treatment Parameters
Treatment Parameter Normal Model Semiparametric Model
ATE 0.887 0.415
(0.054) (0.129)
TT 1.048 1.073
(0.066) (0.131)
TUT 0.809 0.107
(0.066) (0.213)
MPRTE - P +  0.956 0.929
(0.054) (0.068)
MPRTE - P (1 + ) 0.916 0.809
(0.055) (0.101)
MPRTE - Zk +  0.937 0.884
(0.053) (0.066)
Note: Standard errors are presented in parenthesis and were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Table 18: P-Values for di¤erent Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis Normal Model Semiparametric Model
TT =MPRTEP+ 0.000 0.000
TT =MPRTEP (1+) 0.000 0.001
TT =MPRTEZk+ 0.000 0.000
Note: Standard errors were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Table 19: Treatment Parameters for Household Income Categories 1 and 2
Treatment Parameter Normal Model Semiparametric Model
ATE 0.646 0.139
(0.053) (0.193)
TT 0.757 0.845
(0.065) (0.156)
TUT 0.593 -0.181
(0.065) (0.300)
MPRTE - P +  0.693 0.675
(0.053) (0.075)
MPRTE - P (1 + ) 0.669 0.541
(0.053) (0.106)
MPRTE - Zk +  0.681 0.620
(0.052) (0.074)
Notas: The household income category 1 considers income levels ranging from $0 to $278,000 CLP and the household
income category 2 from $278,000 to $834,000 CLP. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis and were estimated with 1,000
bootstrap replications.
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Table 20: Treatment Parameters for Household Income Category 3
Treatment Parameter Normal Model Semiparametric Model
ATE 1.118 0.839
(0.054) (0.273)
TT 1.090 1.377
(0.193) (0.366)
TUT 1.149 0.281
(0.178) (0.488)
MPRTE - P +  1.120 1.169
(0.150) (0.195)
MPRTE - P (1 + ) 1.127 1.042
(0.156) (0.274)
MPRTE - Zk +  1.119 1.222
(0.151) (0.172)
Notas: The household income category 3 considers income levels from $834,000 CLP and on. Standard errors are presented
in parenthesis and were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Table 21: P-Values for di¤erent Hypothesis Tests (Household Income Categories 1 and 2)
Hypothesis Normal Model Semiparametric Model
TT =MPRTEP+ 0.000 0.000
TT =MPRTEP (1+) 0.000 0.070
TT =MPRTEZk+ 0.000 0.002
Notas: The household income category 1 considers income levels ranging from $0 to $278,000 CLP and the household
income category 2 from $278,000 to $834,000 CLP. Standard errors were estimated with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
Table 22: P-Values for di¤erent Hypothesis Tests (Household Income Category 3)
Hypothesis Normal Model Semiparametric Model
TT =MPRTEP+ 0.000 0.060
TT =MPRTEP (1+) 0.000 0.207
TT =MPRTEZk+ 0.000 0.029
Notas: The household income category 3 considers income levels from $834,000 CLP and on. Standard errors were estimated
with 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 1: Total Undergraduate Enrollment
Source: Authorselaboration based on information of the Chilean Ministry of Education.
Figure 2: Total Number of Financial Aids by Type
Source: Authorselaboration based on information of the Chilean Ministry of Education.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Propensity Score for Treated and Untreated
Source: Authorselaboration.
Figure 4: Marginal Treatment E¤ect (Normal Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: Condence intervals were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 5: Marginal Treatment E¤ect (Semiparametric Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: Condence intervals were calculated using 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 6: Conditional Probability Density Function
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
X
P
f(
P|
X)
Source: Authorselaboration.
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Figure 7: Conditional Probability Density Function for Household Income Categories 1
and 2
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Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 1 considers income levels ranging from $0 to $278,000
CLP and the household income category 2 from $278,000 to $834,000 CLP.
Figure 8: Conditional Probability Density Function for Household Income Category 3
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Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 3 considers income levels from $834,000 CLP and on.
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Figure 9: Marginal Treatment E¤ect for Household Income Categories 1 and 2 (Normal
Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 1 considers income levels ranging from $0 to $278,000
CLP and the household income category 2 from $278,000 to $834,000 CLP. The condence intervals were estimtaed using 1,000
bootstrap replications.
Figure 10: Marginal Treatment E¤ect for Household Income Category 3 (Normal
Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 3 considers income levels from $834,000 CLP and on.
The condence intervals were estimtaed using 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 11: Marginal Treatment E¤ect for Household Income Categories 1 and 2 (Semi-
parametric Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 1 considers income levels ranging from $0 to $278,000
CLP and the household income category 2 from $278,000 to $834,000 CLP. The condence intervals were estimtaed using 1,000
bootstrap replications.
Figure 12: Marginal Treatment E¤ect for Household Income Category 3 (Semipara-
metric Model)
Source: Authorselaboration. Note: The household income category 3 considers income levels from $834,000 CLP and on.
The condence intervals were estimtaed using 1,000 bootstrap replications.
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